Monitoring Corruption: From the “Top ” or the “Bottom”? Evidence from a Bribery Experiment

(preliminary draft, please do not circulate) Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external controls and the sever-ity of punishment. An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for reform. This paper investigates the effectiveness of bottom-up anti-corruption measures as opposed to top-down interventions, using data from a specifically designed economic experiment. In particular, we explore whether public servants ’ ten-dency to ask for bribes is more affected by the presence of external controls or by the possibility for the victims of bribery to formally re-port the corrupt agents, knowing that formal reports are associated with a fixed probability of punishment. We find that bottom-up anti-corruption measures can be highly effective in curbing corruption, even when citizens ’ “voice ” leads to formal punishment with a relatively low probability. In contrast, conventional top-down interventions may prove ineffective and, in addition, have adverse effects on corruption by inducing corrupt officials to demand higher bribes